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Abstract 
Focussing on the long-run effects of ‘financialisation’ and increasing shareholder power in a 
simple Post-Kaleckian endogenous growth model, we examine the effects of increasing 
shareholder power on the demand regime, on the productivity regime, and on the overall 
regime of the model. Under special conditions increasing shareholder power may have 
positive effects on capital accumulation and productivity growth and hence on potential 
growth of the economy. However, such a regime does not only require directly positive – or 
under certain conditions only weakly negative – effects of increasing shareholder power on 
the productivity regime. It also requires expansive – or under special circumstances only 
weakly contractive – effects of increasing shareholder power on capital accumulation via the 
demand regime of the economy. Both conditions have recently been questioned on empirical 
grounds, so that an overall long-run ‘contractive’ regime seems to be the most likely outcome 
of ‘financialisation’, rising shareholder power and pronounced shareholder value orientation. 
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1. Introduction 
Focussing on the changes in the relationship between financial and non-financial sectors in 
developed and developing economies during the recent three decades, which have been 
generally labelled as ‘financialisation’,1 Post-Keynesian have suggested a variety of 
approaches integrating these developments into demand-led distribution and growth models.2 
The following channels of influence of ‘financialisation’ have been identified and 
introduced:3
1. Both the objectives and the constraints of firms as a whole may be affected by increasing 
‘financialisation’. On the one hand, rising shareholder power subordinates management’s and 
workers’ preference for (long-run) growth of the firm to shareholders’ preference for (short-
term) profitability. On the other hand, increasing dividend payments, share buybacks etc. 
restrict the availability of finance for firms’ real investment projects. 
2. New opportunities (and longer term risks) for households in terms of wealth-based and 
debt-financed consumption arise. The reasons for this are financial asset price booms 
associated with shareholder value orientation of firms, financial market liberalisation, and 
new credit instruments made available to households by banks. 
3. Distribution of income will be affected due to changes in power relations between 
shareholders, managers and workers, which will then feed back on investment and 
consumption. 
                                                 
1 According to Epstein (2005: 3) ‘[…] financialization means the increasing role of financial motives, 
financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and 
international economies’. See Krippner (2005), Orhangazi (2008), Palley (2008), and the contributions 
in Epstein (2005) for a detailed treatment of the development in the US and other countries, van 
Treeck (2009a) and van Treeck/Hein/Duenhaupt (2007) for a comparison of the macroeconomics of 
‘financialisation’ in the US and Germany, and Stockhammer (2008) for the development in Europe. 
2 See for instance the earlier work by Boyer (2000), the papers with partial models on the effects of 
‘financialisation’ on investment by Stockhammer (2004, 2005-6) and on consumption by 
Bhaduri/Laski/Riese (2006) and Dutt (2006a), the flow models by Hein (2008) and Hein/van Treeck 
(2010b), and complete, stock-flow consistent models, with either simulations or analytical solutions, 
by Dallery/van Treeck (2008), Hein (2009, 2010), Lavoie (2008), Skott/Ryoo (2008a, 2008b), and van 
Treeck (2009b). For a review see Hein/van Treeck (2010a). 
3 For a brief survey on empirical and econometric evidence for these channels of influence of 
‘financialisation’ see Hein (2010). 
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Based on the contradictory effects of ‘financialisation’ on investment and consumption and on 
the impact on distribution, different potential macroeconomic growth regimes have been 
suggested in the literature. Some authors have considered the possibility of a ‘finance-led 
growth’ regime (Boyer, 2000), in which shareholder value orientation has an overall positive 
impact on the rates of capacity utilisation, profit and growth. Other authors, starting with 
Cordonnier (2006), have argued that a regime of ‘profits without investment’ might emerge. 
In this regime, rising interest or dividend payments of firms to rentiers (or share buybacks) are 
associated with increasing rates of profit and capacity utilisation, but with a falling rate of 
capital accumulation. Finally, some authors have shown that a ‘contractive’ regime may arise, 
in which higher interest and dividend payments to rentiers have a restrictive effect on the rates 
of capacity utilisation, profit and capital accumulation (Hein, 2008, 2009, 2010; Hein/van 
Treeck, 2010b; van Treeck, 2008, 2009b).4 As shown in Hein (2009, 2010), the financial 
structure of the firm sector, i.e. the debt-capital or the outside finance-capital ratio, in ‘profits 
without investment’ and ‘contractive’ regimes are prone to cumulative instability. In the 
disequilibrium process, these regimes give rise to a ‘paradox of outside finance’ reminiscent 
of Steindl’s (1952: 113-122) ‘paradox of debt’: Falling (rising) rates of capital accumulation 
induce firms to attempt to reduce (raise) the outside finance-capital ratio, but the 
macroeconomic effects of such a behaviour is that this ratio will keep on increasing (falling) 
feeding back negatively (positively) on capital accumulation. 
 
In the present paper, we do not intend to add further variants of complete stock-flow 
consistent models to the literature, but we rather focus on the long-run effects of 
‘financialisation’ on capital accumulation and productivity growth – and hence on potential 
                                                 
4 As Hein/van Treeck (2010b) have shown, only the ‚profits without investment’ regime displays a 
strict micro-macro-relationship, whereas the other two regimes generate fallacies of composition. The 
‚finance-led growth’ regime generates a ‚paradox of accumulation’ and the ‚contractive’ regime 
suffers from a ‚paradox of profits’. 
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growth. In particular the effect on productivity growth has not yet been addressed in Post-
Keynesian distribution and growth models dealing with ‘financialisation’ issues and 
increasing shareholder power. This is surprising because, on the one hand, the early orthodox 
proponents of shareholder value orientation had argued that increasing shareholder power 
would induce managers to make more efficient use of the funds at their disposal and thus 
reduce the inefficiencies inherent in the ‘principal-agent’ conflict of modern corporations 
(Jensen/Meckling, 1976). Therefore, increasing shareholder power and shareholder value 
orientation of management should have a positive effect on productivity growth and the 
economy’s growth potential. On the other hand, those who have argued that ‘financialisation’, 
increasing shareholder power and rising shareholder value orientation of management would 
cause a policy of ‘downsize and distribute’ (Lazonick/O’Sullivan, 2000), in order to satisfy 
shareholders’ demand for distributed profits and high stock and share prices, should have 
expected that low capital stock growth associated with such a policy would also have negative 
effects on productivity growth and thus on long-run potential growth of the economy as a 
whole.  
 
We address these potentially contradicting effects of ‘financialisation’ on capital 
accumulation and productivity growth in a simple Post-Kaleckian distribution and growth 
model for a closed private economy with endogenously determined productivity growth. 
Having presented the basic model features in Section 2, we will then make use of the 
distinction between demand and productivity regime, suggested by Setterfield/Cornwall 
(2002), we analyse the demand regime in Section 3, and then the productivity regime in 
Section 4. In Section 5 the overall regime will be derived and the effects of increasing 
shareholder power will be discussed. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. The basic model 
 
The effects of ‘financialisation’ and increasing shareholder power will be integrated into a 
Post-Kaleckian distribution and growth model with an extension of the investment function 
proposed by Bhaduri/Marglin (1990). An increase in shareholder power will be considered to 
be the exogenous variable in our model, both for the demand and the productivity regime. For 
the analysis of the demand regime we will take productivity growth to be an exogenous 
variable, which will then be endogenised in the analysis of the productivity regime. Finally, in 
the overall regime, the equilibrium rates of capital accumulation and productivity growth will 
be determined endogenously and the effects of increasing shareholder power will be derived. 
 
We assume a closed private economy. Under given conditions of production, there is just one 
type of commodity produced which can be used for consumption and investment purposes. 
There is no overhead-labour and in order to simplify the following discussion we assume that 
technical progress is labour saving and capital embodied. Technical progress is hence 
associated with a falling labour-output-ratio (a = L/Y) and rising labour productivity (y = 
Y/L). The capital-labour-ratio (k = K/L) increases at the same rate as labour productivity 
does, and the capital-potential output-ratio (v = K/Yv), therefore remains constant. This means 
we assume Harrod-neutral technical progress, as in Rowthorn (1981), Cassetti (2003) and 
Dutt (2003). For the sake of simplicity we also do not consider depreciations. The rate of 
capacity utilisation (u) is given by the relation between actual real output and potential real 
output. Pricing and distribution of income between different social groups in the model can be 
described by the following equations:  
 
( )[ ] 0m,0m,wam1p ≥Ω∂
∂>Ω+= ,        (1) 
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Writing w for the nominal wage rate, we assume that firms set prices (p) according to a mark-
up (m) on unit labour costs in the incompletely competitive goods market (equation 1). 
Following Kalecki (1954: 17-18), the mark-up is mainly determined by the degree of price 
competition in the goods markets and by the relative powers of capital and labour in the 
labour market. The profit share (h), i.e. the proportion of total profits (Π) in nominal output 
(pY), is therefore determined by the mark-up (equation 2). The mark-up and the profit share 
may become elastic with respect to a change in shareholder power (Ω) vis-à-vis management 
and labourers, as will be discussed in more detail below. The profit rate (r) relates the annual 
flow of profits to the nominal capital stock and can be decomposed into the profit share, the 
rate of capacity utilisation and the reciprocal of the capital-potential output ratio (equation 3). 
 
Since long-term finance of firms’ capital stock in our model consists of firms’ accumulated 
retained earnings controlled by owners/managers and equity and bonds held by rentiers’ 
households, total profits (Π) split into firms’ retained profits (ΠF), on the one hand, and 
dividends paid on equity held by rentiers (Rd) as well as interest paid on debt (Ri) also 
accruing to rentiers’ households, on the other hand (equation 4). In order to simplify further 
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analysis, we synthesize dividend and interest payments to rentiers and thus only have to 
consider retained profits vs. distributed profits (R). Dividing by the nominal capital stock, we 
can distinguish a rentiers’ profit rate (rR) (equation 5) and a firms’ profit rate (rF) (equation 6), 
which sum up to the total profit rate (equation 7).  
 
‘Financialisation’ and rising shareholder power will be associated with increasing rentiers’ 
demand for distributed dividends. It may also be accompanied by increasing interest 
payments, if the process of financialisation is characterised by the substitution of own capital 
by debt (debt-financed mergers and acquisitions, debt-financed share buybacks), as has been 
observed in the US and recently also in Germany (see Krippner, 2005; van 
Treeck/Hein/Dünhaupt, 2007; van Treeck, 2009a). Therefore, we assume that an increase in 
shareholder power will also cause an increase in the rentiers’ profit rate. With a given total 
rate of profit, a given capital-potential output ratio, given income distribution between capital 
and labour, and a given rate of capacity utilisation, an increase in the rentiers’ rate of profit 
would cause a decrease in the firms’ rate of profit (equation 7). However, as will be seen 
below, as the rate of capacity utilisation is an endogenous variable in our model, the total rate 
of profit will generally not remain constant in the face of a change in the rentiers’ rate of 
profit.5
 
Further on, a persistent increase in shareholder power (Ω) is likely to affect distribution 
between capital and labour. If ‘financialisation’ and rising shareholder power reduce the 
degree of competition in the goods market as a consequence of mergers and acquisitions, 
hostile takeovers, etc., and, in particular, if the bargaining power of labour unions in the 
labour market decreases as a result of firms’ ‘downsize and redistribute’ strategy and (the 
                                                 
5 Of course, one may also consider the possibility that an increase in shareholder power reduces the 
rentiers’ profit rate, when there are strong contractive macroeconomic effects on the overall profit rate. 
Here, we exclude this possibility for simplicity. 
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threat of) increasing unemployment, rising dividend payments to shareholders will be 
associated with an increasing mark-up in firms’ pricing (equation 1). Under these conditions, 
increasing shareholder power will hence be accompanied by an increasing share of total profit 
in income (equation 2) and by a falling share of labour income. 
 
 
3. The demand regime 
 
Saving, investment and the goods market equilibrium of the model are described by the 
following equations: 
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For the determination of the goods market equilibrium we assume a classical saving 
hypothesis, i.e. labourers do not save. The part of profits retained is completely saved by 
definition. The part of profits distributed to rentiers’ households is used by those households 
according to their propensity to save (sR). Therefore, we get the saving rate (σ) in equation (8) 
which relates total saving to the nominal capital stock. 
 
The accumulation rate (g), relating net investment (I) to the capital stock (equation 9) is based 
on the investment function proposed by Bhaduri/Marglin (1990). Investment decisions are 
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assumed to be positively affected by expected sales (proxied by the rate of capacity 
utilisation) and by unit profits (and hence the profit share), because both increase the 
(expected) profit rate. Distributed profits, the dividends and interest payments to rentiers, 
have a negative impact on investment, because they reduce retained earnings and firms’ own 
means of investment finance. This also limits the access to external funds in imperfect capital 
markets, according to Kalecki’s (1937) ‘principle of increasing risk’.  
 
Based on a ‘growth-profit trade-off’ at the firm level, as implied by the Post-Keynesian theory 
of the firm (Lavoie 1992: chapt. 3), pronounced shareholder value orientation is likely to be 
associated with a high preference for short-term profitability at the expense of the propensity 
to invest in real capital stock (Crotty, 1990; Stockhammer, 2005-6). This has two dimensions. 
Increasing shareholder power vis-à-vis management will increase the rentiers’ rate of profit 
and reduce available funds for real investment and growth of the firm. But increasing 
shareholder power will not only affect investment through this ‘internal finance channel’. 
Management’s ‘animal spirits’, reflected in the constant α in the investment function, will 
decline and might even become negative when managers are aligned with shareholders 
through stock option programmes and the threat of hostile takeovers in an active market of 
corporate control. Even if the availability of internal funds were irrelevant for firms’ 
investment decisions, increasing shareholder power would negatively affect investment 
through this ‘preference channel’. Our investment function hence captures two channels of 
transmission of increasing shareholder power on real investment: the ‘internal finance 
channel’ and the ‘preference channel’. 
 
We also include technical progress, which for the time being is assumed to be exogenous, into 
the investment function, following the procedure suggested by Rowthorn (1981), Lavoie 
(1992: 316-322) and Dutt (2003). Since technical progress is embodied in capital stock, it will 
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stimulate investment. Firms have to invest in new machines and equipment in order to gain 
from productivity growth ( ) which is made available by new technologies. This effect on 
investment will be the more pronounced the more fundamental technical change is: The 
invention of new basic technologies will have a stronger effect on real investment than 
marginal changes in technologies already in existence.
yˆ
6
 
The goods market equilibrium is determined by the equality of saving and investment 
decisions (equation 10). The goods market stability condition requires that the saving rate 
responds more elastically to changes in capacity utilisation than capital accumulation does 
(equations 11). Finally, we obtain the following goods market equilibrium values for the rates 
of capacity utilisation, profit and capital accumulation: 
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In what follows, the discussion of the effects of increasing shareholder power on the demand 
regime will assume stable goods market equilibria, and we will focus here on the effects on 
                                                 
6 Dutt (2003) also discusses potential effects of technical progress on saving – new products and hence 
consumption possibilities may cause a reduction in the propensity to save – and on the mark-up and 
hence income distribution – technology leaders may increase their mark-ups and hence the profit share 
for the economy as a whole. We will not integrate these effects into our model. 
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capital accumulation only.7 We have two channels of influence of rising shareholder power 
via firms’ investment, the ‘preference channel’ with 0<Ω∂
α∂  and the ‘finance channel’ with 
0r
R
>Ω∂
∂ . Further on we have a potential ‘distribution channel’ with 0h ≥Ω∂
∂ . For the demand 
regime of our model, we get the following total effects of an increase in shareholder power on 
capital accumulation: 
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As can be seen from the first term in the numerator, the effect of increasing shareholder power 
via the ‘preference channel’ is negative. The effect via the ‘finance channel’, however, may 
be negative or positive, because increasing dividend payments mean a loss of internal means 
of finance for firms with a negative impact on investment, but they also increase rentiers’ 
income with a direct positive impact on consumption and an indirect one on investment. The 
overall effect of the ‘finance channel’ will hence depend on the rentiers’ propensity to save 
and on the elasticities of firms’ investment with respect to distributed profits and to capacity 
utilisation, as can be seen from the second term in the numerator. Finally, if rising shareholder 
power has a positive effect on the profit share, the ‘distribution channel’ will have ambiguous 
effects on equilibrium capital accumulation, too, because the accumulation regime in the 
model may either be wage-led or profit-led, as can be seen from the third term in the 
numerator. If unit profits have a strong impact on investment decisions and the impact of 
capacity utilisation is rather weak, capital accumulation tends to become profit-led and 
                                                 
7 For a more detailed discussion including the effects on the rates of capacity utilisation and profit in 
similar models see Hein (2009, 2010) and Hein/van Treeck (2010b). 
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redistribution at the expense of labour will push capital accumulation. If however the impact 
of unit profits is weak and the effect of aggregate demand and hence the rate of capacity 
utilisation is strong, accumulation will become wage-led and redistribution at the expense of 
labour in the face of rising shareholder power will affect capital accumulation in a negative 
way. 
 
Therefore, depending on the parameter values of our model, the effect of increasing 
shareholder power on equilibrium capital accumulation in the demand regime may be 
‘expansive’ or ‘contractive’: 
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An ‘expansive’ demand regime is obtained, if the following conditions are given: a low 
propensity to save out of rentiers’ income, little importance of distributed profits (and hence 
internal funds) for firms’ investment decisions, weak relevance of the ‘preference channel’ for 
firms’ investment decisions relative to the ‘finance channel’, and a high responsiveness of 
investment with respect to the profit share. A ‘contractive’ demand regime will prevail under 
the opposite conditions. 
 
 
4. The productivity regime 
 
Within Post-Keynesian distribution and growth theory, in particular Kaldor has developed 
different ways to endogenise technological change. In his technical progress function (Kaldor, 
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1957, 1961), productivity growth is positively affected by the growth of capital stock and 
capital intensity, because technical progress is capital embodied. Another possibility has been 
proposed by Kaldor (1966) looking for an explanation of the (slow) growth in the United 
Kingdom. There he applies Verdoorn’s Law. According to Verdoorn (1949), the growth rate 
of labour productivity in industrial production is positively associated with the growth rate of 
output.8 This can be explained by static and dynamic economies of scale. Following these 
approaches implies that the growth rate of labour productivity is positively affected by the 
dynamics of output and capital stock. Rowthorn (1981), Lavoie (1992: 322-327), and Dutt 
(2003), for example, have chosen the latter way of integrating productivity growth into 
Kaleckian distribution and growth models, and we will follow their suggestion here. 
 
Apart from capital accumulation, we will consider two further determinants of productivity 
growth. First, we assume a direct effect of increasing shareholder power on productivity 
growth: Following the arguments put forward by early proponents of shareholder value 
orientation (Jensen/Meckling, 1976), we assume that increasing shareholder power and the 
associated higher dividend payouts demanded by shareholders, weaker ability of firms to 
obtain new equity finance through stock issues (which tend to decrease share prices), 
increased threat of hostile takeovers in a liberalised market for corporate control (Manne, 
1965), as well as financial market-oriented remuneration schemes (Fama, 1980), push 
managements to make more efficient use of the resources at their disposal. This should have 
positive effects on labour productivity growth and potential growth of the economy, at least 
initially.9 However, as Jensen (2005) and Rappaport (2005) have argued recently, there may 
be drawbacks if shareholder value orientation goes too far, productivity enhancing investment 
is undermined by share buy-backs and dividend payouts, and management’s short-termism 
                                                 
8 For empirical evidence on Verdoorn’s Law see the survey by McCombie/Pugno/Soro (2002) and the 
recent work by Vergeer/Kleinknecht (2007) and Hein/Tarassow (2009). 
9 It should also have a negative impact on the capital-potential output ratio, at least temporarily. This 
effect will be neglected in order to keep the analysis as simple as possible. 
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becomes an obstacle to efficiency and productivity gains – and finally to shareholder value 
itself. The effect of shareholder power on productivity growth may thus be non-linear. 
However, in our simple model, we will first consider only a directly positive partial effect of 
shareholder power on productivity growth and we will come back to potential drawbacks 
when we discuss the macroeconomic feedbacks in the total model in Section 5. 
 
Second we include a wage-push variable into the productivity growth equation, as in Taylor 
(1991: 225-228), Cassetti (2003), Naastepad (2006), and Hein/Tarassow (2009). We thus 
make use of an idea proposed by Marx (1867) and Hicks (1932).10 The argument is as 
follows: Low unemployment and increasing bargaining power of employees and their labour 
unions will speed up the increase in nominal and real wages which will finally generate a 
rising wage share and hence a falling profit share.11 This will accelerate firms’ efforts to 
improve productivity growth in order to prevent the profit share from falling. Dutt (2006b) 
has recently argued that increasing pressure from lower unemployment and rising real wages 
will accelerate the diffusion of innovations and will thus increase productivity growth.12 Since 
rising shareholder power may have a depressing effect on labourers’ bargaining power and on 
the wage share, as argued above, this may have an indirect negative effect on productivity 
growth. 
 
Taking into account capital stock growth, shareholder power and the profit share as 
determinants yields the following simple equation for labour productivity growth: 
 
                                                 
10 See also Lima (2004) who makes use of a non-linear effect of the wage share on technological 
innovations in a somewhat more complex model than ours. However, in his model there is no 
Verdoorn effect or technical progress function. See also Lima (2000). 
11 In a Kaleckian model of an open economy, as the one presented here, nominal wage growth 
exceeding productivity growth will cause a rise in the wage share and a drop in the profit share, even if 
the mark-up on unit labour costs in firms’ pricing remains constant (Hein 2005). 
12 For empirical evidence on wage push variables on productivity growth see recently Marquetti 
(2004), Naastepad (2006), Vergeer/Kleinknecht (2007), and Hein/Tarassow (2009). 
 14
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The constant in equation (16) can be interpreted as representing ‘learning by doing’. As in the 
demand regime, a change in shareholder power has ambiguous effects on the productivity 
regime in this simple linear version of the productivity growth equation, taking capital 
accumulation as given: 
 
Ω∂
∂ρ−ϑ=Ω∂
∂ hyˆ .   (17) 
 
Whereas the direct effect of increasing shareholder power on productivity growth is positive, 
the indirect effect via the profit share is negative and may thus overwhelm the direct effect, so 
that the overall effect is indeterminate. The condition for a positive effect is: 
 
Ω∂
∂ρ>ϑ>Ω∂
∂ hify :,ˆ 0 .   (17’) 
 
The productivity regime may therefore be ‘expansive’ or ‘contractive’, too. The ‘expansive’ 
regime is given when the effect of shareholder power on productivity growth is strong and the 
wage-push effect is weak and/or redistribution at the expense of the wage share is only 
moderate. 
 
 
5. Increasing shareholder power and the overall regime 
 
In order to discuss the total effect of a change in shareholder power on the demand and 
productivity regimes together, we first have to determine the overall equilibrium with given 
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shareholder power. Graphically, we obtain this equilibrium in Figure 1, which contains the 
goods market equilibrium rate of capital accumulation from equation (14) and the 
productivity equation (16). With given shareholder power (Ω ), we obtain a joint equilibrium 
in which the rate of capital accumulation (g**) and the growth rate of labour productivity 
( ) are determined endogenously.*yˆ 13 The ‘natural rate of growth’, or potential growth, is 
hence endogenous in our model. 
 
Figure 1: Growth equilibrium with endogenous productivity growth 
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Analytically we obtain from equations (14) and (16) the following results for the endogenous 
growth equilibrium: 
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13 Of course, the rates of capacity and profit can be determined endogenously in this model, too. 
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The existence and stability of the overall equilibrium requires that the slope of the capital 
accumulation function exceeds the slope of the productivity function in Figure 1. From 
equations (14) and (16) we obtain the following condition for this: 
 
( ) 01 >β−εω−
v
h           (20)  
 
This implies that the reaction of capital accumulation with respect to productivity growth and 
productivity growth with respect to capital accumulation have to be moderate in order for an 
overall equilibrium to exist and to be stable.14 In what follows we assume this condition to 
hold. From equations (18) and (19) we can derive the effects of rising shareholder power on 
the overall equilibrium, i.e. on the equilibrium rates of capital accumulation and productivity 
growth: 
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14 Comparing stability condition (20) for the overall regime, with feedbacks between capital 
accumulation and productivity growth, with the stability condition (11) for the demand regime, with 
exogenous productivity growth, shows that the former is more stringent than the latter. See Lavoie 
(1992: 325) for a similar result in a different Kaleckian model. 
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( ) β−εω−
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ β−τΩ∂
∂+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ θ−−βΩ∂
∂+Ω∂
α∂ε+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ρΩ∂
∂−ϑ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ β−
=Ω∂
∂
1
11
v
h
uh
v
h
v
hsr
v
hh
v
h
y R
R
*ˆ .  (22) 
 
If both the demand regime and the productivity regime are expansive in the face of rising 
shareholder power, it follows that ( ) ( ) 011 >β−τΩ∂
∂+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ θ−−βΩ∂
∂+Ω∂
α∂ uh
v
h
v
hsr
v
h
R
R
 and 
0>ρΩ∂
∂−ϑ h . Therefore, the numerators in equations (21) and (22) will be both positive and 
the overall regime will be expansive, too. And if both the demand regime and the productivity 
regime are contractive, it follows that ( ) ( ) 011 <β−τΩ∂
∂+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ θ−−βΩ∂
∂+Ω∂
α∂ uh
v
h
v
hsr
v
h
R
R
 and 
0<ρΩ∂
∂−ϑ h , and thus the overall regime will be contractive, too. 
 
If however, the demand regime is contractive (expansive) and the productivity regime is 
expansive (contractive) the two terms in the numerators of equations (21) and (22) have 
opposite signs and the overall effect of rising shareholder power depends on the relative 
strength of each partial effect. In Figures 2a-c this is shown for a ‘contractive’ demand regime 
and an ‘expansive’ productivity regime, in which a change in shareholder power has opposite 
partial effects on capital accumulation and on productivity growth. The overall results will 
therefore depend on the relative strength of each of these partial effects. If the contractive 
effect on the demand regime is rather weak, and the expansive effect on the productivity 
regime is strong, we obtain an overall expansive regime, as shown in Figure 2a: Capital 
accumulation and productivity growth increase with rising shareholder power. However, if 
the negative effect on the demand regime is very pronounced and the positive effect on the 
productivity regime is weak, we obtain an overall contractive regime, as can be seen in Figure 
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2c: The rates of capital accumulation and productivity growth decrease in the face of rising 
shareholder power. With intermediate partial effects on demand and productivity regimes, an 
overall intermediate regime is possible as well: Increasing shareholder power triggers slower 
capital accumulation but faster productivity growth, as is displayed in Figure 2b.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Increasing shareholder power, ‘expansive’ productivity regime and 
‘contractive’ demand regime 
 
a) Expansive overall regime 
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b) Intermediate overall regime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c) Contractive overall regime 
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Table 1: Demand, productivity and overall regime in the face of rising shareholder power 
Demand regime 
 
Contractive ( 0<Ω∂∂ /*g ) Expansive ( 0>Ω∂∂ /*g ) 
Ω∂∂ /**g Ω∂∂ /*yˆ Overall 
regime 
Ω∂∂ /**g Ω∂∂ /*yˆ Overall 
regime 
+ + Expansive 
+ – Intermediate
Contractive 
( ) 0<Ω∂∂ /yˆ
– – Contractive 
– – Contractive 
Ω∂∂ /**g Ω∂∂ /*yˆ Overall 
regime 
Ω∂∂ /**g Ω∂∂ /*yˆ Overall 
regime 
– – Contractive 
– + Intermediate
Productivity 
regime 
Expansive 
( ) 0>Ω∂∂ /yˆ
+ + Expansive 
+ + Expansive 
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In Table 1 the potential effects of changing shareholder power on the overall regime are 
summarised. Under special conditions increasing shareholder power may indeed have positive 
effects on capital accumulation and productivity growth and hence on the overall regime of 
the economy. Such a regime emerges for sure if increasing shareholder power has positive 
effects on firms’ productivity growth via management’s use of the resources at their disposal, 
and rising shareholder power triggers rising capital accumulation. However, it might also 
arise, if there is a strongly positive effect on capital accumulation but a weakly negative effect 
on productivity growth, or a weakly negative effect on capital accumulation but a strongly 
positive effect on productivity growth.  
 
An overall contractive regime will arise if the effects of rising shareholder power on 
productivity and demand regimes are negative each, or if it is strongly negative for one 
regime but only weakly positive for the other. If rising shareholder power has moderately 
positive effects on one regime but moderately negative ones on the other, intermediate 
regimes with rising (falling) rates of accumulation but falling (rising) rates of capital 
accumulation might emerge. 
 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
 
Focussing on the long-run effects of ‘financialisation’ and increasing shareholder power in a 
simple Post-Kaleckian endogenous growth model, we have found that under special 
conditions increasing shareholder power may indeed have positive effects on capital 
accumulation and productivity growth and hence on potential growth of the economy, as 
implied by the claims of the early protagonists of the concept of shareholder value orientation. 
However, such a regime does not only require directly positive effects of increasing 
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shareholder power on the productivity regime – or only weakly negative effects if there are 
strongly positive effects on the demand regime. It also requires expansive effects of 
increasing shareholder power on capital accumulation via the demand regime of the economy 
– or only weakly negative effects if there are strongly positive effects on the productivity 
regime. The former condition has recently been questioned by the protagonists of the 
shareholder value concept themselves (Jensen, 2005; Rappaport, 2005) and it has also been 
questioned on empirical grounds (Graham/Harvey/Rajgopal, 2005). The latter condition 
requires extreme assumptions regarding the determinants of saving and investment and it has 
been put into question by empirical studies on the effects of ‘financialisation’ and increasing 
shareholder power on firms’ real investment (Orhangazi, 2008; Stockhammer, 2005-6) and on 
the prevailing demand regime (van Treeck, 2008, 2009a; van Treeck/Hein/Dünhaupt, 2007): 
Although being able to generate high levels of demand and profits at the macroeconomic level 
for considerable periods of time, building on wealth-based and credit-financed consumption 
demand, increasing ‘financialisation’ and shareholder power seems to cause a general 
weakness of capital accumulation. This does not only generate financial and real instability, 
as has been analysed elsewhere (Hein, 2009, 2010). Depressed capital accumulation is also 
very likely to feed back negatively on productivity growth and hence on long-run potential 
growth of the economy, as shown in the present paper. Therefore, an overall long-run 
‘contractive’ regime seems to be the most likely outcome of ‘financialisation’, rising 
shareholder power and pronounced shareholder value orientation in a Post-Kaleckian 
endogenous growth model. 
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